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Abstract 
This paper argues that the development of a critical approach to technology from an ANT perspective 
is both possible and necessary. This approach to critique is not based on the belief in the autonomous 
and rational human agent since it fully acknowledges human/technological entanglement. It is argued 
that such an approach could make a contribution to the field of critical research of information 
systems (CRIS). It is also argued that an emphasis on critique is needed within the corpus of ANT 
studies which are often accused of managerialism. It is further argued that a form of critique is 
possible within ANT in spite of various sceptical views. In the light of the processes of translation in 
the formation of network, a conception of critique is developed on the basis of Latour’s view of 
“irreduction” of entities. The central critical question deals with the ways in which entities are 
betrayed within the process of translation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although critical research has slowly gained momentum in information systems research (ISR) in the 
past 20 years, its underlying humanistic beliefs led to an unattentiveness to the operations and effects 
of technology (Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). As a consequence critical research in IS is not any different 
from critical research in organisations and management. The increasing and pervasive role of 
technology in organisatons necessitates, however, a rethink of critique. A typical comment about the 
inability to conceptualise technology in organisations is made by Berg (1998, p. 466) in relation to ISR 
informed by structuration theory. He states, with reference to Button (1993), that the problem with a 
structurational view of technology is that its exclusive allocation of agency to humans causes the 
technology to ‘vanish’ from the accounts while it “figures as a mere occasion” for social structuring 
“without any activity or specificity of its own”. If the significant role of technology in IS is taken 
seriously, it also necessitates a reconceptualisation of critique. This reconceptualisation is not only of 
value to ISR, but also to a critical understanding of all forms of human/technology entanglements.  
This paper wants to define a kind of critique that goes beyond the traditional “humanistic” forms. 
Critique is humanistic when it takes the human agent as the centre and when it makes a sharp 
distinction between humans and technology. In these conceptions the terrains of the human and the 
technology are clearly separated and each one is defined sui generis. This separation makes it possible 
for humans to gain critical distance from the technological artefact and to overcome problematical 
elements of their involvement without technological mediation. The critique is made possible through 
recourse to meta-theoretical perspectives of an epistemic or deontological nature. Most of the critical 
approaches in ISR has such a humanist bias whether they draw on Habermas (Hirschheim et al., 
1996), or on critical ethnography (Klein & Myers, 1999) or on structuration theory of Giddens 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).  
These two elements (centrality of the human agent and a human/technology dualism) of humanistic 
forms of critique need to be challenged. The centred human is challenged in  postmodernism (Doolin, 
1998) which renders critique in the form of multiple narratives through which the whole is unmasked 
as fragmented and contingent. While postmodern theories show that a centred critical researcher is not 
feasible, they remain in the discursive realm. The idea that everything is discourse and that technology 
is (only) text, makes it impossible to deal with the materiality of technology. Although the human is 
being decentred, the basic dualism between humans and technology remains in place here. 
This dualism is being challenged by sociomaterial theories which have been developed to understand 
the human/technology entanglement (Haraway, 1991; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). These views lead to 
the realisation that the human and the technological could not be clearly separated and demarcated and 
that all entities are hybrids. It is not possible to identify human nature in isolation from various kinds 
of technological mediations. If the decentred human and the human/technology entanglement are fully 
acknowledged, the question arises about the possibility and nature of the critique. Whereas humanistic 
forms of critique are based on a view of the autonomous human, the nature and possibility of critique 
itself could be questioned in sociomaterial views. Humans cannot disentangle themselves any more 
from various kinds of technological devices in order to gain a distant critical perspective. The question 
is then how could technology be a focus of critique if it cannot be clearly distinguished from the 
human? How is critique possible in a situation where humans are not the only actants? How is critique 
of technology possible if we cannot separate ourselves from technological effects? 
In order to develop a different approach to critique, we need to become more specific about 
technological effects. Conceptions of critique are closely related to conceptions of technology. Various 
attempts (such as DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Rose & Treux, 2000) have been made to be more specific 
about the technological artefact after the call by Monteiro & Hanseth (1996, p. 378). This call for 
specificity should not be seen as a quest for more precise definitions of the essential nature of 
technology, but for ways to gain more clarity about the functioning and effects of technology in any 
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collective. The task is to find the tools that would allow us to establish in a more detailed way the 
effects of technology in a collective.  
This paper investigates the possibility and nature of critique from an actor-network theory (ANT) 
perspective. It is argued that a view in which the actancy of technology in heterogeneous collectives is 
recognised, makes an approach to critique possible that goes deeper than the “humanistic” forms 
because it would make visible the multiple ways in which technology penetrates into all spheres.  
The paper provides first a selective account of ANT to highlight its conceptions of technology and to 
articulate an understanding of critique. It then uses and expands on an existing ANT informed study to 
illustrate what an ANT approach to critique might look like in practice. It is argued that, once the 
seamless unity of sociomaterial collectives is acknowledged, critique cannot be based on a notion of 
the autonomous and rational human since we are always inside  the collectives which mediate our very 
understandings and critiques. We are always, as Haraway (1991) comments, “inside the belly of the 
beast”. It is therefore not possible to disentangle ourselves from these collectives in order to gain an 
outside perspective. It is argued that ANT makes such a approach to critique possible so that we could 
become critically aware of our involvement and being implicated in hybrid associatons.  
2. ANT 
This attempt to develop an ANT approach to critique may come as a surprise for two reasons. Firstly 
ANT is mainly known for its careful, descriptive ethnographic studies of various kinds of assemblies 
such as socio-technical systems. Ethnographic research stands in the tradition of interpretative 
approaches that are as such not critical, since there is no critical intention or critical method (Stahl, 
2008). ANT also does not attempt to develop a critical ethnograpy as understood by Klein & Myers 
(1999). Secondly, the suspicion that ANT is not conducive to critical research is confirmed by the 
many instances where it is employed in the service of managerialism in organisational studies 
(Monteiro, 2004, p. 132; Star, 1991). The ANT concepts of actant, enrolment, translation and 
irreversibility are used in managerial approaches to show how networks could be constructed and 
maintained in a more coherent way through the alignment of interests. Scepticism has therefore been 
expressed by Walsham (1997) about the critical possibilities in an approach where a clear distinction is 
not made between the human and the technical and where the possibility does not exist of a 
perspective outside the network from where critique could be launched. This is echoed by Saldanha  
(2003) who provides a summary of the ways in which ANT fails to be critical: It is managerialist, 
centrist, relativist, not geographical enough, too anti-humanist and too local. After having attempted to 
develop critique based on ANT, Mitev (2009) found that ANT does not provide adequate tools for a 
critical analysis of information systems and has to be augmented with a critical theory of power. 
It is argued here that ANT does make a form of critique possible that has the potential to cut deeper 
than other forms of critique and that broadens the scope of critique. It cuts deeper because it is 
centrally concerned about the ways identities are shifted and subjectivities produced. It is also broader 
because it incorporates the active contribution of different kinds of entities. In brief, critique in ANT 
has to be understood in an ontological and moral way. It is interested in the ways worlds are being 
produced through translations and associations. It is also interested in the multiple ways the identity 
and interests of any entity are being betrayed in the social processes of assembly. In the rest of this 
section, the process of translation through which heterogeneous networks are assembled, the role of 
technology and the meaning of critique will be discussed. 
The processes of assembly refer to the ways actor-networks (or collectives) come into being and how 
they are composed and maintained. The networks are heterogeneous in the sense that any kind of 
entity could become an actant. The reference to “any kind of entity” refers to ANT’s theory of 
generalised symmetry. This entails that no a priori distinction could be made between humans and 
nonhumans when the processes of assembly are traced. Because of the symmetry, the concept “social” 
does not only refer to human relations, but to the relations between all kinds of entities. “Social” refers 
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therefore as much to the relation between humans, as to the relation between circuits on a 
motherboard, or between the human and the laptop. In its focus to trace the ways in which a macro-
actant comes into being and the ways in which power and resources are distributed in a collective, 
ANT makes explicit how interests are being translated and shifted. Interests are as much translated 
among humans as among humans and nonhumans. It is therefore important not only to trace the 
transactions between humans, but also those between nonhumans and those between humans and 
nonhumans. This expansion of the concept social to all kinds of relations makes it possible to trace all 
the shifts (or translations) that are taking place when entities are being associated. This methodological 
principle of symmetry does not mean that there are no differences between entities (as claimed i.a. by 
Mitev 2009, p. 20) because it is precisely ANT’s purpose to trace how differences are being produced 
and roles allocated in an actor-network. The principle of symmetry is essential because it would not be 
possible to trace this production if stable identities and differences are already inscribed into the nature 
of things. It would also not be possible to trace the actants freely accross the whole spectrum of all 
kinds of entities if predefined boundaries are imposed beforehand and if predefined characteristics are 
ascribed to entities. The allocation, for example, of the attributes “intentional” or “rational” to explain 
human actions undermines the attempt to explain how these actions are produced in a particular actor-
network. No entity should be labelled “human” or “natural” or “technological”  (or “system” or 
“lifeworld”) before the assembling has been traced. Since all these attributes and categories are 
outcomes of processes of assembly, they cannot be used as the basis of explanations, but are in need of 
explanation themselves. The reason is that the investigation which traces all the translations would 
already be prejudiced by these prior decisions.  
The processes of assembly consists of the association of one entity with another. In order for an entity 
to become associated with another, it has to undergo a process of translation. Translation is not simply 
the process in which meanings in one language are converted equivalently into another language. 
Within the ANT context of assembly where entities are enrolled within the networks of others, 
translation refers to the ways the purposes, interests and identities of entities are changed in order to 
become enrolled within a collective. Although translation suggests equivalence, it is important to be 
aware of the various and subtle ways in which changes take place during the translation process. 
During the process of translation “[t]he identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the margins 
of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited” (Callon, 1986, p. 203). Latour (1995) illustrates this with 
his classical example of the cat, the seagull, the modified door and the catflap. He states that the 
technological processes would not have been possible if identities were to remain fixed. For an 
enrolment to be successful, the translation of interests and identities should take place. The concept of 
translation provides ANT with a methodological tool to trace the way in which a collective comes 
about. It makes it possible to trace how power is accumulated  and how resources are distributed in a 
collective. Any entity could be an actant as long as it “makes a difference”, or has an effect on others. 
The important insight of ANT is that it provides the conceptual tools to trace the ways in which all 
kinds of heterogeneous actants participate in the establishment and maintenance of a collective. It is 
possible for a human to enrol another human in a plan of action, or for humans to be enrolled through 
the inscription of roles in an information infrastructure.  
Technology plays an important role in the assembly processes since it contributes to the change and 
stabilisation of identities. In the development of an IS, technology does not only play the role of an 
intermediary which obediently conveys messages as designed, but it mediates the interests of all 
entities involved. In the process of mediation, purposes, identities and interests change. The 
significance of the roles technology plays lies in its tremendous power to effect certain shifts, and, 
once black-boxed, to hide the shifts that took place. The notion of irreversibility (Callon, 1991, p. 159) 
refers to the stage in the development of a collective where it is very difficult to go back to the place 
where identities and relations were still fluid. ANT steers a course between the extreme views where 
technology is seen as a mere social construction or as a substantive entity determining its own 
application. The effects of technology in a particular context cannot be explained with reference to 
such inscribed or inherent features, but should be traced to the whole of the actor-network within 
which technology plays a role. The “affordances” of technology does not determine its use, but is a 
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“prediction” and “promise” (Latour, 2002, p. 250) of what it might bring into the collective. To state 
that technology makes everything to “stand reserve” (Heidegger, 1977) already prejudges the outcome 
of an investigation. Actancy is only possible once various entities are aligned in a network from where 
power is drawn. Technology is a powerful actant when it becomes an irreversible black box. The 
process of technologising also entails the reversal of force where the weak becomes powerful through 
the enrolment of technological entities. Technology therefore plays a significant role in the collective 
in the ways it contributes to the shift and stabilisation of identities. If technology is seen as an actant it 
does not simply execute what is inscribed into it, but prescribes behaviour to others in ways that were 
not anticipated by designers or implementers. These effects of technology can only be established 
through empirical research by careful (ethnographic) tracing of all entities. Since the critique of 
technology is centrally interested in these effects it has to trace actants. 
ANT does not function with a theory or system of values as an orientation point from where critique 
could be rendered. It remains true to its ethnographic roots by “following the actors” consistently. 
Critique is not the suspicion of actors’ narratives as proposed in critical ethnography (Bowker & Star, 
1994; Klein & Myers, 1999) since the researcher cannot claim to know better than the subjects 
themselves by going beyond them to uncover their real motives or the underlying causes of their 
actions. The possibility of critique could only arise once the collective has been traced carefully in 
order to allow all the entities to show to what extent their interests have been betrayed and their 
subjectivities produced. While critique is centrally interested in these betrayals, the extent of betrayal 
cannot be established in a simple and unambiguous way in the absence of essentialistic identities. 
While the theoretical and value-laden perspective of the researcher cannot define the betrayal, the 
voice of the subject cannot be taken at face value, either. It cannot simply be said that the oppressed 
worker or colonial subject provides the definitive critique of the collective, since no subject (or 
marginalised) position could be privileged. The task of the critical researcher is to juxtapose multiple 
voices in a pinboard fashion with the expectation that betrayals may become visible to the insiders 
(Law, 2002). The hope is that the visibility of the ways and extents to which interests of all subjects 
have been shifted could enable these subjects to devise strategies to resist or change the way in which 
they were enrolled.  
Since there is no meta-narrative in ANT, critique is not spectacular and sweeping, but limited and 
specific. It is not a sweeping process which aims at a general judgement that could be applied in a 
particular situation. A critical approach in ANT is centrally interested in how the macro-actant comes 
into being and how its position is maintained through the translation and enrolment of others. Critique 
is basically interested in the ways in which identities are created, resources are distributed and the 
extent to which the processes of tanslation represent forms of betrayal. The ontological basis of 
critique lies in its interests to show how and to what extent the identity and interests of entities are 
shifted.  
This approach to critique is rooted in Latour’s theory of “irreductions” which descibes the ontology of 
all entities. Latour states that “[n]othing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else” 
(Latour, 1993, p. 158). This ontological principle is related to a moral principle. Any entity could be 
related (reduced) to any other entity, but no such relation does justice to the entity itself. Although any 
entity could be related (reduced) to any other entity, no such relation represents the unique identity of 
the entity. The possibility for any entity to be reduced to any other entity refers to the endless scope for 
association. From this follows the moral element which cautions against the ways in which one entity 
is reduced to any other. It echoes Law’s (1997) comment that any translation is also simultaneously a 
betrayal. While avoiding any notion of essentialism, Latour makes a negative statement by claiming 
that no entity could be reduced to any other. One implication of this is that no entity could be reduced 
to its relations with others. It does not mean that a core, substantial identity escapes these relations. 
The essentialism ANT wants to avoid is one where such a substantive identity is postulated and used to 
explain radical difference. The notion of “irreductions” does not claim a positive identity, but states it 
rather negatively. Further insight into the process of translation is now possible. Any association 
(similarity) between any two entities is not the outcome of natural qualities, but is created through 
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translation. Since each entity is absolutely unique, it could not simply be seen as an instance of 
anything else (such as a universal law). This uniqueness of an entity cannot be fully described or 
known since it is not possible to establish the essence of an entity.  
Because of the entanglement of the human and technological, critique cannot be understood in 
isolation from critique of the collective as a whole. No actancy within a collective could be seen in 
isolation from the others because they draw on each other and interchange power and resources. The 
kind of actancy exercised by a particular technological artefact is dependent on its relations within the 
collective. It is therefore not possible to isolate a “critique of technology” from a critical evaluation of 
the processes of translation in a collective. It is possible, however, to trace empirically the kind of 
actancy technology exercises in a particular context. Because of the invisible effects of technology it is 
essential to find ways to identify and trace these hidden effects. Since technology exercises power and 
has certain effects care must be taken with a view to the kinds of roles they play.  
3. CHANGING WORK AND IDENTITIES 
The study of Bloomfield & McLean (1996) is being used to illustrate how the role of technology could 
be critically approached. While this study represents an attempt to provide a critical account of 
technology, some aspects need to be expanded and emphasised to illustrate the particular critical focus. 
Bloomfield & McLean (1996) investigate the design and implementation of Care Manager System, an 
information system in the National Health Service in the UK as part of the implementation of a Care 
Programme Approach which focuses on psychiatric patients outside institutions. They locate this 
system against the background of recent trends in psychiatry which emphasise the wholeness, integrity 
and autonomy of the person. It is motivated by a notion of empowerment and recognition of the rights 
and sovereignty of the mental health patient (ibid., p. 376). A more holistic approach is followed to 
ensure the care of patients who are not institutionalised any more, but remain in their own 
communities. The system wants to ensure an equal distribution of services and the identification of all 
the needs of the patients.  
In order to provide these services detailed information is needed about each patient. This information 
is not only of a clinical nature, but includes social, cultural and practical aspects of patients’ lives. 
Information systems were developed to manage all the information. Central in these information 
processes is the form which the “keyworkers” had to use to capture the profiles of the patients. The 
keyworkers who are relatively low-skilled officials, complete the forms during their consultations with 
the patients. This involvement of the patient is seen as an important element of the system based on a 
notion of autonomy. Autonomy is portrayed in Enlightenment terms as insight into the self and as a 
form of self-government. Because patients are seen as autonomous and rational human beings, they 
are required to participate in the identification of their needs and to take responsibility for the 
information that is gathered about them. The patient is produced as a particular kind of choosing and 
rational actant. Through categories contained in the form, patients’ details and medical needs are 
gathered and organised.  
In order to analyse this case study critically in the attempt to draw implications for an ANT approach, 
we focus on the technology of the form. The form is not simply an intermediary which prescribes to 
others the behaviours that are inscribed into it, but it is an actant which actively contributes to changes 
that were not anticipated and that are not always desirable. The form defines the identities not only of 
the patient, but also of the keyworkers and the psychiatrists. The patient’s interests are translated into 
the categories of possible needs the form makes provision for. In this way the intentions of the Care 
Manager System are mediated through the detour of the form. While the initial aim was to promote a 
level of standardisation and efficiency through predefined categories, patients’ needs are 
predetermined. The projection of patients as autonomous and participative in the establishment of their 
needs makes them responsible and accountable for what is captured on the form.  
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The study is an example of a critical ANT approach to technology because it makes explicit and 
problematise the effects of the technological mediation on the nature and functioning of a particular 
system of health care. While the motives of patient integrity, self-management and responsibility are 
certainly important in a health care system that aims to be emancipatory, the intentions and goals shift 
once the technological mediator enters the scene. The forms, designed to capture patients’ needs 
effectively, became a powerful and central actant in the psychiatric process. The forms redefine the 
needs of patients, capture their accountability and enable the relatively low-skilled keyworkers to 
diagnose and assess patients.  
Bloomfield & McLean (1996, p. 386) show that the form plays a role to construct psychiatric practice. 
In this process the interests of patients, keyworkers, and psychiatrics are translated. The critical 
question is not so much whether, but to what extent their interests are being shifted and whether it 
could be seen as a betrayal. If one were to focus on the problematical aspects of the technological 
effects, one could see how the keyworkers are produced as information managers concerned about the 
correct completion of the forms, or how the psychiatrists found that their practice has changed to one 
where they experienced an overload of paperwork. This leads to the comment: “As we spend more 
time filling in forms there is less time available for patient care” (ibid.). Communication with the 
patient is not so much informed by their professional interests and competence, but it is shaped by the 
need to complete a form. The form therefore produces the framework for the communication with the 
patient. The result is that mental health care has been translated into a form of information 
management (ibid., p. 378). Psychiatric diagnosis is determined by what could be captured and 
processed by the form. Psychiatrists found themselves dealing more with forms than with patients, a 
fact which redefines their primary professional focus. It became clear that the strong inscriptions on 
the form did not translate the patients’ needs truthfully when some of them withdrew from the process 
that intended to empower them.  
This critique does not have the intention to disband the technological intervention, or to see 
technology necessarily as Ge-stell (Heidegger, 1977) where everything is treated as a resource, but to 
show how technology contributes to the drift (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000) in the collective and to the 
way work and identity are redefined and how agency and resources are redistributed. It is clear that the 
introduction of technology does not simply lead towards either increased surveillance or enhanced 
emancipation. Bloomfield & McLean describe how IT could be a “source of oppression and control”. 
They ask the question whether IT is “enslaving or emancipating” (Bloomfield & McLean, 1996, p. 
372). In this process they do not use a narrative of empowerment but focus on how “subjects are 
constituted as empowered” (ibid.). Although psychiatric care has moved out of the psychiatric ward 
into the community, the attention shifted in a holistic way to patients’ needs, and patients participate 
more actively in their own diagnosis, it does not imply empowerment and emancipation in a simple 
way. The patients are constituted as autonomous, independent and responsible for themselves and for 
their own diagnosis. Technology became a necessary means to achieve these goals and, typically, 
constitutes a detour which introduces different goals and unintended effects, some of which seem to be 
clearly undesirable.  
The material inscription of the categories provides stability and irreversibility and once the forms 
became a black box they generate certain outcomes. It is clear that the form exerts a kind of actancy 
which adds new intentions and goals to those that informed the design. To the initial purpose of 
processing information effectively was added a new definition of knowledge as what could be 
processed by a form. In this process the information which is not included in the predefined categories 
is excluded. The information management of which the form is a key element, reshapes the patients’ 
needs, the role of the keyworkers and the professional practice of the psychiatrists. The forms and lists 
mediated the assessment and interpretation of patients’ needs (ibid., p. 374). As such they also exclude 
needs that are not part of the classificatory system with the result that it is not possible for the patients 
to include needs that are not predefined by the form. 
From an ANT perspective, the critical approach in this study is still limited because the various actants 
have not been adequately followed. In order to provide a more comprehensive form of analysis and 
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critique, it should have included the narratives of the patients who might have elaborated on the effects 
of the technology which lead to the withdrawal of some. This might have indicated more clearly how 
and to what extent the form betrayed their interest. This would indicate that the “irreducibility” of the 
patients is affected in an attempt to reduce their needs to what is contained in the forms. The 
technology also prescribes to patients a form of rationality and choice with which they may feel 
uncomfortable. One could also listen more to the testimony of the forms which faithfully captured a 
wide range of patient needs and stored it patiently until it could be retrieved. The information system 
could testify to the way it placed psychiatrists in a discretionary position from where decisions about 
patients could be taken. 
In spite of these limitations, this case illustrates how technology contributed to the redefinition of the 
identities and interests of patients and psychiatrists. It also created the new identity of the relatively 
unskilled keyworkers who were enabled to perform a relatively high-level function. This shaping of 
identities and interests are inherent in the technical details of the form. On the basis of the effects of 
this particular form one could gain some understanding of the relation between design and outcomes. 
This is not a deterministic relation since technology could have a different effect in another collective. 
In this particular collective the form actually prescribes the kind of discourse that will take place 
between the patients, keyworker and the psychiatrist. 
ANT avoids a technological determinism where identities and behaviour are necessary effects the 
technological design. ANT also avoids social constructivism where the effects of technology are 
determined by social meanings. It acknowledges on the one hand the materiality of technology 
associated with the presence of irresistable force, and the sociality of technology associated with its 
flexibility. Although technology is designed with particular purposes in mind, it may have effects in a 
particular collective that stand in a loose relation to the intentions of the design. An investigation of the 
intentions and design of the technology provides an inadequate view of its effects. While the particular 
effects of technology should be traced as an outcome of a particular collective, the power and intensity 
of these effects have to do with the materiality of the technology. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the study of Bloomfield & McLean provides a limited account of the way in which 
ANT might make critique possible by focusing on the way the identity and interests of entities in a 
network (such as the patient, the key worker or the psyciatrist in this case) are shifted in ways they 
may experience as problematical. In this process these entities are reduced to conform to an identity 
prescribed by the technology of the form. In this process their “irreducibility” has been violated. 
It has been argued that technology is not only designed to inscribe, but that it also prescribes the 
identities, interests and behaviour of entities. Technology does not only prescribe what is inscribed 
into it since it acts to effect changes that were not anticipated. One should not regard technology as the 
monster with an own substantial (good or evil) identity that only has certain kinds of effects. Exactly 
what effects it has depends on the particular actor-network of which it is part and from which it draws 
its strength. The particular ways in which technologies became part of a collective determines the 
kinds of effect it has. This effect could be subtle and powerful and is often undetected and 
underestimated. Since the exponentially increasing rate of the effects of technology could be expected 
to continue, critical investigation of technology is necessary. This critique cannot be based on the 
assumptions that humans are autonomous beings that could control or limit technology. Neither can it 
be based on the assumption that technology is a substantive entity on its own which always exerts a 
certain kind of effect, regardless of the particular context within which it functions. A more fine-
grained approach calls for a close investigation of the particular effects of technology within a 
particular context to establish in what ways and to what extent the identity of entities have been 
betrayed. It has been argued that ANT provides the means to analyse and critique the role of 
technology in a collective and that such an investigation is essential in the light of the ways in which 
existence is shaped through the proliferation of technological actants. It has been shown that a critique 
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of technology is not only possible in ANT, but also a necessity to avoid the accusations of 
managerialism with its apparent preoccupation with the micro-level of analysis. 
This article has shown how a kind of critique of technology is possible which takes the unavoidable 
sociomaterial nature of a collective into account. This is done in such a way that the technological 
could still become a focus of attention as long as the the concept of the social is adequately expanded. 
The critique focuses on the active role of technology which cannot be attributed to an essential nature, 
or to the way it is a mere product of human design. To recognise the active role of technology is to see 
how it effects changes that could not be attributed to a form of technological determinism or to the 
inscribed design. Once these two possible explanations of technological effects are avoided, it 
becomes possible for the critical researcher to attend closely to the kinds of effects technology has in a 
particular context. While most of the work in ANT deals with these kinds of effects, a critical angle 
asks the normative question as well. This normative question cannot be asked from a centricist or a 
meta-position but has to be asked from the inside. The key element in this normative questioning is the 
extent to which entities are betrayed in the associative processes of translation. The critical researcher 
has an important role to play in enabling insiders to articulate these betrayals and in making it visible 
to others. Transformation does not flow automatically from critique, but is dependent on the kinds of 
actions insiders will take in response to the betrayals. The discussion of the case study has shown that 
power could be assembled locally in an artefact.The multiple narratives about this concentration of 
power could reveal the implications for the various entities of these powerful effects. It could reveal 
how the effects of power are inscribed in the identity and agency of the entities and how these entities 
participate further in the generation of the power. 
An insight into the nature of critique should enable insiders to become more critically involved in the 
processes of translation. Critique needs not only be rendered afterwards, but it could accompany the 
very processes of assembly. Once participants realise that any technological intervention is inevitably 
a mediation of identities and interests, they could be alerted to the subtle shifts that is implied in their 
own involvement. 
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